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1 It is not uncommon, when reading and writing about philosophical traditions, to be
highly  selective.  Especially  so  when the  tradition under  review has  been contested
among its friends and foes alike since its very beginning. This has surely been, and still
is, the case with pragmatism, where depending on the narrative spun we would have
very  different  figures  foregrounded  or  rather  eclipsed.  One  might  well  speak  of
pragmatisms  in  the  plural,  as  the  Peirceans,  the  Jamesians,  the  Deweyeans,  and so
forth1 – where later installments are usually presented as updated varieties of earlier
ones – all have very strong feelings about the (allegedly) competing accounts. More
often than not, these accounts formed and then dismantled alliances in order to build
master-narratives about longer-term legacies within the tradition. Banners gained in
respect, only to progressively fading away and possibly coming back either in disguise
or hand in hand with past competitors – sometimes with uncomfortable rust between
the two still very much in view. This is what, among other things, makes pragmatism a
rather lively and appealing tradition: by studying its trajectory one would in fact face
rather surprising twists and turns, a number of intra- and extra-tradition alliances, as
well as deep legacies which helped it not only to outlive the philosophical turmoil of
the twentieth-century, but also to establish itself among the most promising voices (a
choir, indeed) in the twenty-first. This was some productive, as opposed to destructive,
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agonism:  an  engagement  only  occasionally  –  yet  not  unpainfully  –  stained  by
politically-driven (that is academic) turf wars.
2 Now, the Lewisians, for a long time little more than a jolly book club, are currently on
the rising. And for good reasons, according to the editors of the book under review.
Pragmatism  in  Transition aims  in  fact  to  dust  off  the  work  of  a mastermind  of
pragmatism who sat between the gilded age of classical pragmatism and the seminal if
contested one of mid-century pragmatism. Despite the relatively poor attendance they
received, C.I. Lewis’s writings have been in fact pivotal to the very unfolding of the
tradition. Lewis himself was a remarkable figure: an enthusiastic student of James and
Royce, a suspicious roommate sharing his office with Peirce’s (uncollected) papers, a
dissenting voice among the “realists” of the 1920s and 1930s, tutor of W. Sellars, Quine,
and N. Goodman at Harvard, and most recently godfather of the cognitivist  line (as
opposed  to  the  conversationalist  one,  though  nomenclatures  grew buoyant)  within
contemporary  pragmatism,  Lewis  played  the  role  of  a  silent  if  crucial  presence
throughout the various stages of the tradition, and hence a book assessing his legacy is
a particularly welcome addition to the somewhat thin secondary literature. 
3 The editors crafted together contributions by more established and younger scholars,
which form a rather compact and balanced blend, as they do cover the whole spectrum
of Lewis’s writings – his philosophical development (Kegley, Olen), moral philosophy
(Heney), logic (Shieh), and theory of knowledge (Mayoral, Stump, Westphal, Zarebski)
alike –, rather than focusing on his epistemology only as happened too often – though,
the imbalance is still towards the latter. What is interesting to notice, if only in passing,
is that the editors are best known as Sellars scholars: this is rather telling because, as
we  know,  Lewis  and  Sellars  had  a  close  philosophical  relationship  (almost  a
partnership)  in  their  agreeing  on  the  way  key  philosophical  problems  should  be
addressed and yet disagreeing in the solution offered. Two chapters of the book (by
Westphal and Zarebski) investigate this liaison in some detail. As a consequence, the
book will be of particular interest to Sellars scholars, beyond pragmatist sympathizers
or detractors more generally. It  will  also be of interest for scholars working on the
history of analytic philosophy since Lewis was an analytic philosopher, too. Actually, he
was perhaps the first and most notable case of a thinker equally influenced by the two
traditions, and working to bringing them closer to each other – other candidates being
Carnap, Goodman, Quine, White, Putnam, Rorty, and Brandom, with rather disparate
goals  and strategies.  In the volume, this  effort  in philosophical  bridging and cross-
fertilization is shown at work by surveying Lewis’s swinging path from logical theory to
the theory of knowledge through moral and social theory – unfortunately, the latter is
given little space in the volume, even if,  admittedly,  his social  philosophy does not
shine for originality and timelessness. As a whole, the volume offers plenty of food for
thought  to  advancing  our  own  contemporary  investigations  into  matters  of  mind,
morals, and metaphilosophy. This is in fact the very angle of the collection: namely, to
bring Lewis into the contemporary philosophical conversation and check what is still
alive and what is instead dead in his work. As with most collections, the quality of the
contributions  is  uneven,  but  all  the  chapters  are  nicely  crafted  and  genuinely
contribute to the deepening of an aspect of Lewis’s work – to my tastes and interests,
the contributions by Heney, Olen, and Mayoral stand out. Rather than summarizing the
various chapters, I shall conclude by mentioning a few recurring themes as they surface
in the various chapters, concerning the combo of realism, cognitivism, and empiricism. 
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4 As the editors explain in their resourceful introduction to the volume, Lewis’s work
early and late  is  characterized by the attempt to enriching the empiricist  program
(hence demising idealism and rationalism) by bringing to light the interplay of  the
empirical and the conceptual. This is in fact what he sought to accomplish in his earlier
logical and epistemological work, which he then partially revised in his later work on
knowledge and (e)valuation. And this is what made him a pragmatist of a kind: namely,
the  idea  that  it  is  really  our  shifting  conceptual  apparatus  (that  is,  our  shifting
conceptual interests) what drives our empirical investigations and investigations into
the empirical world – the only world creatures like us enjoy and partake in. Now, this is
a  form of  pragmatic  realism because  by  attending  our  practices  of knowledge  and
valuation we would keep track not so much of how things are, but rather of how what
we should be responsive to. Reality becomes a necessary friction in its being a reference
point for assessing our interests and projects. This pragmatic realism, itself a radical
form of empiricism (of Jamesian ancestry), would then count as a cognitivist approach
to  philosophical  issues  as  it  takes  beliefs  and  values  (and  hence  knowledge  and
valuation) as equally truth-apt and hence rationally debatable. The wider stakes of this
philosophical maneuver lie in fact in Lewis’s criticism of those bifurcational accounts of
reality (of which nowadays we have brand new, sophisticated accounts) according to
which  only  Humean  matters  of  fact  (things  and  necessities)  can  be  empirically
assessable while relation of ideas (modals and morals) should be left to the subjective
realm of taste (variously understood). Lewis strongly believed that almost everything
under the sun, from logical connectors to aggregates of matters to moral judgments
could and actually should be equally assessed with reference to what we take their
different reality to be. There would then be not so much degrees of reality (proper as
opposed to quasi-truths)  but  rather different  kinds of  reality  (and hence of  truths)
corresponding to how our concepts about such reality work. If this is the blueprint of
Lewis’s philosophical project, the chapters comprising the volume problematize aspects
of it with reference both to the interlocutors of his time (Dewey, logical empiricism,
Sellars,  Kuhn,  Quine)  and  of  ours  (the  Pittsburgh  School,  expressivism).  It  is  no
surprise, then, that Lewis’s name is today brought by some of the most distinguished
scholars of pragmatism as a still promising perspective to tackle these philosophical
matters,  with newer legacies gaining traction – most notably,  the Peirce-Lewis axis
along which Rosenthal and Misak reconstruct what they think are the best teachings of
pragmatism.  This  volume  breaks  new  interpretative  ground,  and  reinvigorates  the
conversation between Lewisians and others,  thus contributing to the shining of  his
name in the twentieth-century philosophical pantheon, pragmatist and otherwise.
5 A  coda  on  Lewis’s  metaphilosophy  is  in  order.  At  face  value,  Lewis  was  indeed  a
philosopher’s philosopher if there was one, as he wrote on philosophical problems as
they issued in the philosophical discussion as it took place in academic books, journals,
and departmental and professional meetings (as also Olen and Sachs mention at p. 4-5).
He was actually pivotal to the professionalization of philosophy in the US, and in this
respect  he  led (together  with R. B. Perry and a  few others  colleagues)  Harvard and
hence  American  philosophy  departments  from  cultural  centers  in  the  widest
acceptation of the term to scientific hubs. If,  before Lewis, James and Royce trained
their students to become finest intellectuals (philosophers or otherwise), after Lewis
students would train to become finest academic philosophers (and only occasionally
intellectuals).  If  this  picture is  certainly accurate (and the masterful  work of  Bruce
Kuklick is the definitive reference), still two things should be noted. First, if Lewis, an
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ardent  follower of  James and especially  Royce,  became the quintessential  academic
philosopher (but the same can be said of Perry and the other “realists”), then we should
at least partially revise the picture of James and Royce as utterly anti-professionalized
philosophers,  and  rather  investigate  how,  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  classical
pragmatism underwent deep self-criticism and fashioned a philosophy which broke for
sure with the past in its emancipation from theology and metaphysics, but in so doing
prepared the ground for an enlightened professionalization of  philosophical  discussion
inside the academia. Secondly, Lewis himself was not cold to themes and discussions
exceeding the academia. His unsung social philosophy (his The Ground and Nature of the
Right and Our Social Inheritance are usually not even considered as worth reading) is an
example of his deep concerns for what happened outside philosophy halls. We should
should perhaps start to revise his moral philosophy as well as an effort not so much in
philosophical foundation – meta-ethical or normative alike, despite this is exactly how
his ethics looks like, at least superficially–, but rather at philosophical elucidation of
our (his) historical present – and there is plenty of this, despite its title, in the recently
issued Essays on the Foundation of Ethics, where we find more than a gesture towards the
understanding of philosophical ethics as a descriptive yet critical investigation of our
ordinary  moral  situation  for  its  practical  transformation. This  resonates  with  his
earliest  metaphilosophical  views  about  philosophy’s  consisting  in  “the  mind’s  own
study of  itself  in  action;  and the method is  simply reflective.  It  seeks to  formulate
explicitly what from the beginning is our own creation and possession.” (Mind and the
World Order, p. 17). If this task can be sometimes performed from the armchair, still its
point is self-understanding from the point of view of conduct. And such doings are the
plethora of things we commit to, long for, and theorize about in our ways of world-
making well beyond what is usually simplified in oft-caricatural philosophical accounts
of them. Via philosophy we should make explicit (and hence perspicuous) what goes on
outside it (that is, in conduct). This is no small feat, and an aspect of Lewis which would
bring him closer  to  the classical  pragmatists  as  well  as  to  kindred figures  in other
philosophical  traditions.  An  aspect  still  to  be  fully  explored  and  furthered  in  our
present philosophical situation and practice.
NOTES
1. As an aside, which proper treatment would take us way too far, it is rather peculiar how most
pragmatist streams are associated with the names of their respective representative figures in a
way, say, analytic or continental ones are not. For sure we have Wittgensteinian and Quinean or
Heideggerian and Foucauldian philosophies and philosophers, but within pragmatism there has
been an almost perfect coincidence between the names of the master thinker of choice and the
style and content of the endorsed philosophy. This is slowly changing, though, thanks to recent
new  efforts  in  periodization  (both  historical  and  theoretical),  such  as  classical/recent/
contemporary  pragmatism  (see  R. Brandom,  Perspectives  on  Pragmatism,  Cambridge,  Harvard
University Press, 2011) or first-experience/second-language/third-conduct wave in pragmatism
(see C. Koopman, Pragmatism in Transition, New York, Columbia University Press, 2009).
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